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HOMESTEAD PROVISIONS IN NORTH DAKOTA
FLOYD B. SPERRY*

Creditors may lament their very existence but homestead laws
have firmly established their place in American jurisprudence. The
basis of homestead provisions can be traced back to the Twelve
Tables, which required that insolvent debtors sacrifice their bodies
to their creditors. And for hundreds of years after that, debtors
fared little better.
There have been two materially different forms of homestead
legislation in this country. The federal homestead law exempted
from debts lands homesteaded from the public domain until the
issue of a patent therefore; state homestead laws authorized the
head of a family to designate property, owned or to be acquired,
to be exempt under law from his future debts.1
The homestead is peculiarly an American institution, the common
law having no analogous interest or estate.2 It follows, then, that
homestead rights exist only by virtue of constitutional and statutory
provisions.3 In North Dakota homesteads are provided for by the
Constitution4 and defined by statute.5 Basically, the homestead

statutes provide (1) protection of a family from judgment liens,
executions or forced sales,6 (2) a means of strictly regulating
transfer of property necessary for existence of a family,7 and (3)
an orderly mode of descent of such property. 8 Homestead rights

have been described as "wholesome and salutary regulations in
0 Member, Executive Committee, North Dakota State Bar Association; American
Bar Association delegate. LL.B. University of North Dakota.
1. 2 THOMPsoN, REAL PaoPERT § 969 (permanent ed. 1939).
2. Barney v. Leeds, 51 N.H. 253, 261 (1872).
3. First State Bank v. Fischer, 67 N.D. 400, 404, 272 N.W. 752, 755 (1937).
4. "The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of lifeshall be
recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from forced sale to all heads of families a
homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law; and a reasonable
amount of personal property; the kind and value shall be fixed by law. This section shall
not be construed to prevent liens against the homestead for labor done and materials
furnished in the Improvement thereof, In such manner as may be prescribed by law."
N.D. CONST. § 208.
5. "The homestead of every head of the family residing in this state shall consist:
1. If within a town plat, of not to exceed two acres of land upon which
the claimant resides, and the improvements thereon, and not exceeding in
value twenty-five thousand dollars over and above liens or encumbrances
or both.
2. If not within a town plat, of not to exceed In the aggregate more than
one hundred sixty acres, and the dwelling house situated thereon in which
the homestead claimant resides, with all its appurtenances, and all other
Improvements on said land regardless of the value of the same.
Such homestead shall be exempt from Judgment lien and from execution or forced sale,
except as otherwise provided in this chapter. In no case shall the homestead embrace
different lots or tracts of land unless they are contiguous." N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01
(1960).
6. Ibid.
7. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 47-18-05 (1960).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-02 (1960).
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furtherance of a wise, generous and humane public policy, encouragThe
ing the establishment and maintenance of homes. . . ,,
distinctive purpose of homestead exemption laws is to afford debtors
who are heads of families certain immunities which are intended
to secure for their families the necessaries and comforts of life.'"
A mere debtor who is not the head of a family is not accorded any
such immunities. The right of exemption is guaranteed a family,
and all doubt should be resolved in its favor where facts appear
consistent with a good-faith claim of a homestead right." Relinquishment of a homestead is not favored in the law. The offering of
property for sale does not constitute an abandonment of the claim
of a homestead right, the right being associated with the theory of
domicile in determining whether the homestead has been aban2
doned.'
Either the husband or wife may claim the exemption as head
of the family, but in no case is each entitled to a homestead. 1 The
head of a family may include a person who has residing with him,
on the premises and under his care and maintenance, his children
or children of a deceased spouse, whether by birth or by adoption,
and such other relatives as a minor brother or sister, minor children
of a deceased brother or sister, a parent, grandparent, a parent
or grandparent of a deceased spouse, an unmarried sister or any
of the above-mentioned relatives who having obtained4 the age of
majority are unable to care for or support themselves.1
While the statutes describe and limit the homestead "exempalso convey the legal concept that a homestead is an
tion," 15 they
"estate."' 16 In case of intestacy, property subject to homestead
provisions vests in the surviving spouse for life or until remarriage,17
or, in the absence of a surviving spouse, in the minor children.
In addition, the survivors inherit the interest to which they would
be entitled by succession. The homestead character of property
ceases to exist when the surviving spouse dies or remarries or the
minor children obtain their majority."' The homestead is subject
to execution or forced sale in the satisfaction of judgments in certain
instances. 9 However, a prior judgment lien does not become
divested by subsequently acquired rights, which may otherwise
constitute a homestead.2 0 While judgment liens have been held not
9. Dieter v. Fratne, 20, N.D. 484, 489, 128 N.W. 684. 686 (1910).
10. Ness v. Jones, 10 N.D. 587, 591, 88 N.W. 706, 708 (1901).
11. Mandan Mercantile Co. v. Sexton, 29 N.D. 602, 151 N.W. 780 (1915).
12. Larson v. Cole, 76 N.D. 32, 33 N.W.2d 325 (1948).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-02 (1960) ; see also Ness v. Jones, 10 N.D. 587, 88 N.W.
706 (1901).
14.*N.D.
CEr. CODE § 47-18-02 (1960).
15. Supra note 5.
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-02 (1960).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30-16-04 (1960') and 56-01-04 (Supp. 1963).
18. Ruble v. Grafton Nat. Bank, 64 N.D. 129, 250 N.W. 785 (1933).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-04 (1960).
20. First State Bank v. Fischer, 67 N.D. 400, 272 N.W. 752 (1937).
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to affect property occupied as a homestead when the judgment is
entered, they may attach when the homestead is abandoned.2 1
Numerous decisions have been handed down with reference to
the statute governing conveyance of a homestead, 22 particularly
since the discovery of oil in North Dakota, where mineral deeds or
other transfers of real property, including the homestead, were
made. The court has distinguished between the taking of acknowledgements as to the homestead property of married persons
compared with other real estate interests in making a transfer
2
effective. 3
24
Because of the value limitation on certain homestead property
it becomes important to creditors to have the property appraised.
This is provided for in the code. 25 The judgment creditor may apply
to the district court in the county in which the homestead is situated
for appointment of persons to appraise the value of the homestead.
If the homestead is in an estate, then proceedings to have the property
6
set aside are properly brought under Sections 30-16-05 and 30-16-07.2
Application for appraisers must be made upon a verified petition,
setting out the fact that an execution has been levied upon the alleged
homestead, the name of the creditor and the determination that
the value of the homestead exceeds the amount of the exemption.2 7
The petition must be filed with the clerk and a copy, with notice
of time and place, must be served upon the plaintiff at least 10 days
before the hearing. At the hearing the court, on proof of service of
the notice and petition and upon proof of the facts stated in the
petition, may appoint three disinterested residents of the county to
appraise the value of the homestead.
The appraisers must take an oath, examine the premises and
appraise the value of the homestead property.2 8 Should the appraised
value exceed the amount of the homestead exemption, the appraisers
must then determine whether the real property claimed can be
divided without material injury. The report must be returned to
the judge of the district court making the appointment within 15
days after the appointments and must show in writing the appraised
value and determination of whether the property can be divided.2 9
Should the report make it appear that division may be made without
material injury, the court should direct the appraisers to set off
21. Small v. Cunningham, 120 N.W.2d 13, (N.D. 1963).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-05 (1960).
23. See Watson v. Kresse, 130 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1964), where the court says that
usually transfer of estate in realty is not required to be acknowledged or witnessed to
be valid, but the homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encumbered unless the instrument transferring interest therein is executed and acknowledged by husband
and wife.
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (1960).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-18-06 through 47-18-15 (1960).
26. Farmers State Bank v. Bartley, 53 N.D. 376, 206 N.W. 414 (1926).
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-07 (1960).
28. N.*D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-10 (1960).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-11 (1960).
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to the plaintiff so much of the real property, including the residence,
as will amount in value to the homestead exemption. The execution
may then be enforced against the remainder of the real property. 0
Should it appear from the appraisers' report that the real
poperty claimed as a homestead exceeds in value the amount of
the exemption and that it cannot be divided without material injury,
the court must then make an order directing its sale under the
execution. No bid may be received unless it exceeds the amount of
the homestead exemption. 81 Proceeds from the sale must be paid
to the claimant and the balance applied to satisfaction of the execution. If the execution is against a husband whose wife is living,
the court may direct the $25,000 to be deposited in court, to be paid
out only on joint receipt of the husband and wife.3 2 The wife may
intervene in the sale proceedings, or the court may have her brought
in, for the purpose of determing her rights.3 8
Proceeds from the sale of homestead property-whether conveyed
voluntarily or in satisfaction of a lien-are entitled to the same
protection against legal process as the law gives to the homestead
itself, beyond the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and not
exceeding the amount of a homestead exemption.84
Any person who is the head of the family may make a declaration
of homestead; failure to make such a declaration does not impair
the homestead right.3 5 The declaration, containing the status of
the person making it, whether or not the husband and wife join in
the same, the fact of residence on the premises, a description of the
property and its estimated value, must be recorded in the office
86
of the Register of Deeds in the county in which the land is situated.
Sale and disposition of one homestead does not prevent selection or
purchase of another. 7
The county court of the county in which the homestead is situated
may make an order upon application of the owner or his executor,
administrator or, upon proof of mental illness, legal representative
8
permitting sale, conveyance or encumbrance of the homestead.
However, a sale, conveyance or encumbrance made in violation of
the statute is void.3 9 In the case of the mentally ill, notice of application to convey the homestead shall be served upon such persons
0
as directed by the county court and time shall be fixed for a hearing4
Should an order be made granting permission to sell and convey
30.

N.D.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-13 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-14 (1960).
Federal Land Bank v. Rutten, 102 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1939).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-16 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-17 (1960).
Larson v. Cole, 76 N.D. 32, 33 N.W.2d 325 (1948).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-21 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-22 (1960).
See Grotberg v. First National Bank, 54 N.D. 548, 210 N.W. 21 (1926).
N.D. CENT. CODE J 47-18-24 (1960).

CENT. CODE

§ 47-18-12

(1960).
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the homestead, the property may then be sold, but a part of the
proceeds, not to exceed one-third, shall be set aside and invested
under direction of the court for the use and benefit of the mentally
ill spouse. 1 If the husband or wife dies while mentally ill the sum
so set aside reverts to the survivor or, if he or she is dead, descends
in accordance with the laws of succession. 4 2 Subject to the homestead estate and payment of decedent's debts, the homestead, like
other real property of the testator, may be devised to persons other
than those mentioned in the statute governing descent and distribution
43
of real property subject to homestead estate.
Under these conditions it would appear that the homestead
property passes both by the law of inheritance and through the
homestead preservation. A surviving spouse would be protected
to the extent of the homestead right and would also inherit her
interest in the same property, which again would be subject to the
4
right of the homestead for life or until remarriage.
A trailer home located on real property owned by the head of
the family would have the same status as any other property defined
in Section 47-18-01, and the owner would have the same exemption.
The question posed a more difficult problem when the mobile home
was located on someone else's property. Until July 1, 1961, the head
of the family owning a trailer home had no special protection, but
that has been changed by legislation. 5 Aside from this particular
section, a homestead must include real estate; the mobile home
acquires additional status for this purpose.
The North Dakota statutory provisions relating to homesteads
have been changed from time to time, and, with the interpretations
of the Supreme Court, they now appear to be very complete not
only with reference to homesteads but also in regard to the related
question of exemptions. Section 47-18-01, however, contains provisions which, in our rapidly developing society, may raise some
new and difficult problems.
One question that has been litigated many times in the past
is whether the improvements on a homestead, as defined, may be
used for purposes other than a residence and still retain the homestead status. Such situations often arise where a dwelling contains
a place of business operated by the family. Obviously the valuation
question would still control, should the amount exceed the exemption of 25,000 dollars. In a number of cases, the courts have held
that even though the property is not used solely as a place of
residence, but embraces improvements for other purposes, it still
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

N.D. CENT. CODE
N.D. CENT. CODE
N.D. CENT. CODE
See Meidinger v.
N.D. CENT. CODE

§ 47-18-26 (1960).
§ 56-01-04 (Supp. 1963).
§ 30-16-04 (1960).
Security State Bank, 55 N.D.
§ 28-22-02 (Supp. 1963).

301, 312 N.W. 850 (1927).
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retains a homestead status.46 The philosophy behind this rule is
that it places the business man, with his shop, who happens to
live within a town plat upon a basis similar to that preserved for
farmers, who are given a much broader exemption-a quarter section of land and all of the improvements thereon, irrespective of
value. It can be seen that carrying on a business from a rural
homestead would involve no serious problem if the family lived
there, as the question of valuation would not be present. Establishments or places of labor or occupation are adjuncts of a man's
homestead and should be within the meaning of the statutes providing for it. The object of the homestead exemption is to secure
to a debtor not only a house to live in but the means of making a
livelihood.47 Whether the provisions are politic or impolitic appears
to be a question with which the courts are not concerned, but
one for the legislatures. In the mind of the philosophic economist,
taking a broad view of the interests and objects of human society,
such exemption has many reasons in its favor, and the creditors
cannot complain of injustice for the reason that they had knowledge
of such conditions when they extended credit. It is purely a question of policy: that is, whether the advantages obtained by the exemptions are equivalent to the disadavantage arising from the
unwillingness of capital to remain in a community where such an
exemption exists.
Another area of manifest potential for litigation involves the
issue of discrimination between urban and rural homesteads. Much
room is left for controversy under the North Dakota statute. It
will be observed that if the homestead is within a town plat-and
this does not mean only an incorporated city-the exemption may
include but two acres, with improvements, not to exceed 25,000
dollars, above the liens or encumbrances, or both. If the homestead
happens to lie outside of a town plat the acreage can amount to
a quarter section of land and all of the improvements thereon,
irrespective of value. The latter exemption seemingly would apply
not only to farms but also to non-farm residences located outside
a town plat. With the growing trend toward establishment of nonfarm residences outside the limits of towns and cities to avoid the
confinement, high taxes and other restrictions imposed by municipalities, a question arises as to the constitutionality of the exemption
as applied in some instances. For example, if two neighboring
families each own $50,000 homes but one is just inside the city
limits and the other is just outside, the former is subject to a
46. E.g., Bebb v. Crowe, 39 Kan. 342, 18 Pac. 223 (1888); Kelly v. Baker, 10 Minn.
154 (1865); Askley v. Chamberlain, 16 Cal. 181 (1860); Phelps v. Rooney, 9 Wis. 55
(1859).
47. Green v. Richardson, 122 La. 361, 47 So. 682 (1908) ; De Ford v. Painter, 3 Okla.
80, 41 Pac. 96 (1895).
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$25,000 limitation on its homestead exemption while the other's exemption is unlimited.
Sections 11 and 20 of the North Dakota Constitution 8 may have
some application in a contest over the validity of the provisions of
section 47-18-01 of the Century Code. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has held that every presumption is in favor of the propriety
and constitutionality of legislation4 9 and that classification reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of a law otherwise within
the province of the legislature to enact will not render the law
unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding constitutional inhibitions such
as those contained in sections 11 and 20, the legislature may provide a certain classification of citizens to be differently affected
by the same general rule.51 However, classification for legislation
must rest on some difference which has a reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed. 52 And there is still another test: while proper classification is permitted, arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination is forbidden. 3
The basis for the rural exemption is historical in that it was
assumed that 160 acres represented the amount of land, with improvements on it, that would be required for a family's livelihood.
Thus, to a certain extent the unrestricted exemption on rural property is understandable when it applies to farm homesteads which
would require a sizeable amount of land to provide a means of
support for the farm family. But what is the justification for the
statutory discrimination between the town dweller and the nonfarm rural dweller? It would appear that the distinction is not
only arbitrary but also that the purpose of the legislation was
never to provide the one with an advantage over the other.
It is fair to say that this is a question that would justify a
contest for an interpretation and which might justify a careful revision of this section of the exemption laws, particularly in light
of the developments in urban and rural living.
48. Section 11 reads: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."
Section 20 provides: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which
may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen
or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not be granted to all citizens."
49. O'Laughlin v. Carlson, 30 N.D. 213, 219, 152 N.W. 675, 677 (1915).
50. State v. Miller, 129 N.W.2d 356, 364 (N.D. 1964).
51. State ex rel. Dorval v. Hamilton, 20 N.D. 592, 597, 129 N.W. 916, 918 (1910).
52. Beleal v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 15 N.D. 318, 325, 108 N.W. 33, 35 (1906).
53. Vermont Loan & Trust Co. v. Whtthed, 2 N.D. 82, 94, 49 N.W. 318, 320 (1891),
where the Court goes on to say: "From the foregoing proposition it follows of necessity
that the legislature has power to classify persons and subjects for the purpose of legislation and to enact laws applying specially to such classes, and, while the laws thus
enacted operate uniformly upon all members of the class, they are not vulnerable to the
constitutional inhibition under consideration. But this power of the legislature Is circumscribed. It is not an arbitrary power, waiting the will or the whim of the legislature.
:Its exercise must always be within the limits of reason, and of a necessity more or
less pronounced. Classification must be based upon such differences in situation, constitution or purposes, between the persons or things included in the class and those excluded
therefrom, as fairly and naturally suggest the propriety of and necessity for different or
exclusive legislation In the line of the statute in which the classification appears."

